NMC Library

The false promise of superiority : (Record no. 524093)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03355cam a2200421 i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 22869147
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240118144654.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 221117t20232023nyua b 001 0 eng d
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER
LC control number 2022921533
015 ## - NATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY NUMBER
National bibliography number GBC306165
Source bnb
016 7# - NATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC AGENCY CONTROL NUMBER
Record control number 020867469
Source Uk
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0197680860
Qualifying information (hbk.)
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0197680879
Qualifying information (pbk.)
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9780197680865
Qualifying information (hbk.)
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9780197680872
Qualifying information (pbk.)
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (OCoLC)on1346847699
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency YDX
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
Transcribing agency YDX
Modifying agency BDX
-- UKMGB
-- OCLCQ
-- OCLCF
-- CDX
-- SOI
-- DLC
-- MiTN
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code lccopycat
043 ## - GEOGRAPHIC AREA CODE
Geographic area code n-us---
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number U263
Item number .L45 2023
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 355.02/170973
Edition number 23
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Lebovic, James H.,
245 14 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The false promise of superiority :
Remainder of title the United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War /
Statement of responsibility, etc. James H. Lebovic.
246 30 - VARYING FORM OF TITLE
Title proper/short title United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture New York :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Oxford University Press,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice [2023]
264 #4 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice ©2023
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xii, 275 pages :
Other physical details illustrations (black and white) ;
Dimensions 25 cm
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term still image
Content type code sti
Source rdacontent
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Content type code txt
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
Source rdamedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
Source rdacarrier
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references (pages 253-264) and index.
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War -- SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages -- Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry -- Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War -- SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage" -- Chapter 4: Commitment -- Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation -- Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation -- SECTION III: Case Studies -- Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions -- Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. "During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect." - provided by the publisher
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Deterrence (Strategy)
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Nuclear warfare
Geographic subdivision United States.
651 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--GEOGRAPHIC NAME
Geographic name United States
General subdivision Foreign relations.
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Shelving location Date acquired Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Copy number Koha item type
    Library of Congress Classification     Stacks 01/18/2024   U263 .L45 2023 33039001535706 01/29/2024 1 Book

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