The false promise of superiority : the United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War /
Lebovic, James H.,
The false promise of superiority : the United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War / United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War James H. Lebovic. - xii, 275 pages : illustrations (black and white) ; 25 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 253-264) and index.
Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War -- SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages -- Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry -- Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War -- SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage" -- Chapter 4: Commitment -- Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation -- Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation -- SECTION III: Case Studies -- Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions -- Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence.
"During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect." - provided by the publisher
0197680860 0197680879 9780197680865 9780197680872
2022921533
GBC306165 bnb
020867469 Uk
Deterrence (Strategy)
Nuclear warfare--United States.
United States--Foreign relations.
U263 / .L45 2023
355.02/170973
The false promise of superiority : the United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War / United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War James H. Lebovic. - xii, 275 pages : illustrations (black and white) ; 25 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 253-264) and index.
Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War -- SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages -- Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry -- Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War -- SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage" -- Chapter 4: Commitment -- Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation -- Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation -- SECTION III: Case Studies -- Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions -- Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence.
"During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect." - provided by the publisher
0197680860 0197680879 9780197680865 9780197680872
2022921533
GBC306165 bnb
020867469 Uk
Deterrence (Strategy)
Nuclear warfare--United States.
United States--Foreign relations.
U263 / .L45 2023
355.02/170973