000			03561cam a22004574a 4500
003			MiTN
005			20190729102651.0
008			020408s2003 cau b 001 0 eng
035			_a(DNLM)101142354
010			_a 2002005539
020			_a0520237323 (cloth : alk. paper)
040			_aDNLM/DLC _cDLC _dDLC
042			_apcc
049			_aEY8Z
050	0	0	_aRA644.S6 _bK675 2003
060	1	0	_aWC 588 _bK83s 2003
082	0	0	_a616.9/12 _221
100	1		_aKoplow, David A., _d1951-
245	1	0	_aSmallpox : _bthe fight to eradicate a global scourge / _cDavid A. Koplow.
260			_aBerkeley : _bUniversity of California Press, _cc2003.
300			_aix, 265 p. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 247-258) and index.
505	0		_a1. The Rise and Fall of Smallpox -- 2. The Biology of Viruses -- 3. Smallpox as a Biological Weapon -- 4. Environmental Law and Policy -- 5. The World Health Organization -- 6. The Morality of Extinction -- 7. The Case for Extermination -- 8. The Case against Extermination -- 9. Conclusions and Recommendations.
520			_aPublisher description: Though smallpox was eradicated from the planet two decades ago, recent terrorist acts have raised the horrific possibility that rogue states, laboratories, or terrorist groups are in possession of secret stockpiles of the virus that causes the disease, and may be preparing to unleash it on target populations. Because it is a far deadlier killer than other biological warfare agents such as anthrax, and because the universal vaccination against smallpox was halted decades ago, a smallpox attack today would be nothing short of catastrophic. This clear, authoritative study looks at the long and fascinating history of the virus, with an informative overview of the political, biological, environmental, medical, and legal issues surrounding the question of whether or not the virus should be exterminated. The only two known samples of the virus are currently stored in Atlanta and Russia. The World Health Organization has repeatedly scheduled their destruction--an action that would rid the planet of all publicly acknowledged smallpox strains forever. Opponents of this plan argue that by destroying these last samples we are denying the possibility that this unique virus could be turned to beneficial purposes in basic scientific research. Others see the stockpile as part of a deterrent against future germ attacks. Proponents of prompt eradication argue that scientists have already learned all they can from this particular virus, and that by destroying the stockpile we are preventing it from ever falling into the wrong hands. As a thirty-year veteran of arms control issues, David Koplow is uniquely suited to provide readers with an informed and well-considered understanding of the complexities involved in the handling of this deadly virus.
650		0	_aSmallpox.
650		0	_aSmallpox _xPrevention.
650		0	_aSmallpox _xEpidemiology.
650		0	_aSmallpox _xCultures and culture media.
650	1	2	_aSmallpox _xprevention & control _zRussia.
650	1	2	_aSmallpox _xprevention & control _zUnited States.
650	2	2	_aHealth Policy _zRussia.
650	2	2	_aHealth Policy _zUnited States.
650	2	2	_aInternational Cooperation _zRussia.
650	2	2	_aInternational Cooperation _zUnited States.
650	2	2	_aVariola virus _zRussia.
650	2	2	_aVariola virus _zUnited States.
948			_au164213
949			_aRA644 .S6 K675 2003 _wLC _c1 _hEY8Z _i33039000696939
596			_a1
903			_a7202
999			_c7202 _d7202