000			03355cam a2200421 i 4500
001			22869147
005			20240118144654.0
008			221117t20232023nyua b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2022921533
015			_aGBC306165 _2bnb
016	7		_a020867469 _2Uk
020			_a0197680860 _q(hbk.)
020			_a0197680879 _q(pbk.)
020			_a9780197680865 _q(hbk.)
020			_a9780197680872 _q(pbk.)
035			_a(OCoLC)on1346847699
040			_aYDX _beng _erda _cYDX _dBDX _dUKMGB _dOCLCQ _dOCLCF _dCDX _dSOI _dDLC _dMiTN
042			_alccopycat
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aU263 _b.L45 2023
082	0	4	_a355.02/170973 _223
100	1		_aLebovic, James H.,
245	1	4	_aThe false promise of superiority : _bthe United States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War / _cJames H. Lebovic.
246	3	0	_aUnited States and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War
264		1	_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c[2023]
264		4	_c©2023
300			_axii, 275 pages : _billustrations (black and white) ; _c25 cm
336			_astill image _bsti _2rdacontent
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 253-264) and index.
505	0		_aChapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War -- SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages -- Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry -- Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War -- SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage" -- Chapter 4: Commitment -- Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation -- Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation -- SECTION III: Case Studies -- Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions -- Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence.
520			_a"During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect." - provided by the publisher
650		0	_aDeterrence (Strategy)
650		0	_aNuclear warfare _zUnited States.
651		0	_aUnited States _xForeign relations.
999			_c524093 _d524093