000			03368cam a2200349 i 4500
001			21323426
005			20221109135632.0
008			191203s2020 maua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2019046762
020			_a9780674979659 _q(cloth)
040			_aMH/DLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dMiTN
042			_apcc
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aHG2040.5 .U5 _bL48 2020
082	0	0	_a332.7/20973090511 _223
100	1		_aLevitin, Adam Jeremiah,
245	1	4	_aThe great American housing bubble : _bwhat went wrong and how we can protect ourselves in the future / _cAdam J. Levitin, Susan M. Wachter.
264		1	_aCambridge, Massachusetts : _bHarvard University Press, _c2020.
300			_axix, 380 pages : _billustrations ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references pages (283-359) and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction: In praise of homeownership -- Housing finance before the New Deal -- The New Deal mortgage -- The rise of securitization -- The boom and the bubble -- The bubble bursts -- Timing the bubble -- Demand or supply? -- Theories of the bubble -- The securitization daisy chain -- Information failure -- Post-crisis reforms and developments -- Principles for reform -- Meet Franny Meg.
520			_a"The American housing bubble of the 2000s caused the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression. In this definitive account, Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter pinpoint its source: the shift in mortgage financing from securitization by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to "private-label securitization" by Wall Street banks. This change set off a race to the bottom in mortgage underwriting standards, as banks competed in laxity to gain market share. The Great American Housing Bubble tells the story of the transformation of mortgage lending from a dysfunctional, local affair, featuring short-term, interest-only "bullet" loans, to a robust, national market based around the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, a uniquely American innovation that served as the foundation for the middle class. Levitin and Wachter show how Fannie and Freddie's market power kept risk in check until 2003, when mortgage financing shifted sharply to private-label securitization, as lenders looked for a way to sustain lending volume following an unprecedented refinancing wave. Private-label securitization brought a return of bullet loans, which had lower initial payments-enabling borrowers to borrow more-but much greater back-loaded risks. These loans produced a vast oversupply of underpriced mortgage finance that drove up home prices unsustainably. When the bubble burst, it set off a destructive downward spiral of home prices and foreclosures. Levitin and Wachter propose a rebuild of the housing finance system that ensures the widespread availability of the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, while preventing underwriting competition and shifting risk away from the public to private investors"-- _cProvided by publisher.
610	2	0	_aFederal National Mortgage Association.
610	2	0	_aFreddie Mac (Firm)
650		0	_aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.
650		0	_aHousing _zUnited States _xFinance _xHistory.
650		0	_aMortgage loans _zUnited States _xHistory.
700	1		_aWachter, Susan M.,
999			_c522567 _d522567