Too big to fail : the hazards of bank bailouts /
Gary H. Stern, Ron J. Feldman.
- Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, c2004.
- xiii, 230 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-222) and index.
Foreword by Paul Volcker. 1. Introduction: Our Message and Methods. PART 1. Warnings : 2. What Is the Problem? -- 3. Why Protection Is Costly -- 4. How Pervasive Is TBTF? -- 5. Why Protect TBTF Creditors? -- 6. The Growth of TBTF Protection -- 7. Testing Our Thesis: The Cases of Not Too Big to Fail. PART 2. Options : 8. Can the Problem be Addressed? -- 9. Creating the Necessary Foundation -- 10. Reducing Policymakers' Uncertainty -- 11. Limiting Creditor Losses -- 12. Restricting Payment System Spillovers -- 13. Alternatives for Managing Too Big to Fail -- 14. Summary: Talking Points on Too Big to Fail. APPENDIXES: A. FDICIA: An Incomplete Fix. B. Penalizing Policymakers. C. Supervision and Regulation. D. Increasing Market Discipline.
Publisher description: The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly to the economic and social order. Because of such fears, policymakers in many countries-developed and less developed, democratic and autocratic-respond by protecting bank creditors from all or some of the losses they otherwise would face. Failing banks are labeled "too big to fail" (or TBTF). This important new book examines the issues surrounding TBTF, explaining why it is a problem and discussing ways of dealing with it more effectively.
0815781520 (cloth : alk. paper)
2003026258
Bank failures--United States. Bank failures--Government policy--United States. Banks and banking--State supervision. Intervention (Federal government)