Calomiris, Charles W. <br/><br/>
Fragile by design :  the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit / 
Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber. 
 - xi, 570 pages :  illustrations ;  24 cm. 
 - The Princeton economic history of the Western world .
<br/><br/>Includes bibliographical references (pages 507-548) and index. 
<br/><br/>If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses. 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>9780691155241 0691155240 (hbk. : acid-free paper) 
<br/><br/><label>LCCN: </label>2013033110 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Banks and banking--History.<br/>Bank failures--History.<br/>Credit--History.
<br/><br/><label>LC Class. No.: </label>HG1561  / .C35 2014 
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>332.109